Article: US-Ethiopia Engineered Sanctions Against Eritrea

By  Sophia Tesfamariam

“….There is no United Nations! There is an international community that occasionally can be lead by the only real power left in the world; that is the United States, when it suits our interest, when we can get others to go along. And I think it would be a real mistake to count on the United Nations as if it is some disembodied entity out there that can function on its own.… This kind of mindless creation of the United Nations as something different than what is in the United States interest is not going to sell her or anywhere else.…. “The United States makes the UN work when it wants it to work, and that is exactly the way it should be, because the only question, the only question for the United States is what is in our national interest. And if you don’t like that, I’m sorry, but that is the fact…”‐‐ John Bolton, Feb. 3, 1994

Introduction:

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1907 (2009) on 23 December 2009. Eritrea rejected the resolution as being illegal, unfair and unjust. This paper will endeavor to show how the US colluded with the regime in Ethiopia in getting the said sanctions against the State of Eritrea and its people. It will also show how

There is also no evidence to show Eritrea’s violation of the arms embargo in Somalia. There is however, ample evidence to prove that Ethiopia worked to undermine each and every Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia and thwarted all peace initiatives for Somalia.  

The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has publicly admitted that “there was much talk of such involvement [Eritrea’s support for the Islamist group al-Shabab], but there was no way for me to monitor that situation or to know the truth of such a claim…”

 “…Eighty percent of ammunition available at the Somali arms markets was supplied by TFG and Ethiopian troops…. The monitoring committee received details of some 25 military flights by Ethiopia into Somalia and knew that Ethiopian troops had brought military equipment into the country to arm friendly clans…”-(UN Monitoring Group)

“…I would only note that there is also a lot of disinformation floating around Somalia. It has been a country where disinformation has been a parlor game for many years, and I hope that whatever information does exist on these linkages [between al-Ithad and al-Qaeda] is looked at pretty carefully and we try to ferret out the good from the bad…”-(David Shinn, Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia-Voice of America, 19 January 2001)

  “…[Ethiopia is] feeding false intelligence about terrorists being hidden and that sort of thing, because the Ethiopians are deadly afraid of Moslem control and also they have their own Moslem problem among the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia. So they want to keep the Islamists out of power, and they will bring the U.S. into it, if they can…”  (Herman Cohen, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, PBS, 6 June 2006)[iii]

The plane that Eritrea was supposed to have used to transport weapons and fighters to Somalia was found crashed in Uganda while being used by DynCorp, a contractor for the U.S. military and Intelligence service[iv].

“…South African Ambassador to the United Nations Dumisani Kumalo, chairman of the U.N. Security Council's Somalia sanctions committee, also reported to the 15-nation body that corruption in the lawless Horn of Africa country was rampant… Kumalo said the committee had received worrying reports that "elements" of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM, and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were involved in arms trafficking activities, which have the potential to undermine the peace process…Eighty percent of ammunition available at the Somali arms markets was supplied by TFG and Ethiopian troops," Kumalo said in the written text of his remarks to the Security Council…He said his committee viewed the "continued presence of Ethiopian troops on Somali territory as a violation of the arms embargo" on Somalia, where warlords, Islamist insurgents and Ethiopian-backed Somali government forces clash almost daily…The monitoring committee received details of some 25 military flights by Ethiopia into Somalia and knew that Ethiopian troops had brought military equipment into the country to arm "friendly clans," Kumalo said…”- ( Loius Charbonneau, Reuters 22 May 2008)[v]

I.      UN Security Council Resolution 1907 (2009)

 Accusation Against Eritrea As Written In UN Security Council Resolution 1907:

“…Calls upon all Member States, including Eritrea, to support the Djibouti Peace Process and support reconciliation efforts by the TFG in Somalia, and demands that Eritrea cease all efforts to destabilize or overthrow, directly or indirectly, the TFG… Acknowledge its border dispute with Djibouti in Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island, engage actively in dialogue to defuse the tension and engage also in diplomatic efforts leading to a mutually acceptable settlement of the border issue…”

The Security Council violated Eritrea’s right to self determination and Eritrea’s is not obliged under the UN Charter or international law to “recognize the Transitional National Government of Somalia”. There is nothing in international law or the UN Charter that says Eritrea has to bless and “recognize” illegitimate governments, especially when they are not recognized by their own peoples. Self-determination constitutes a limit to SC Chapter VII action and implies that the Council does not have the power to impose or introduce under Chapter VII any particular form of government, rule or administration upon the entire or part of the population of any State against its people’s will.

The Security Council overstepped its boundaries by forcing Eritrea to accept recommendations which violated Eritrea’s rights under the UN Charter Article 33 which says:

"…The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice…"

Article 95 also states the following:

“…Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future…”

This paragraph contains an affirmation of the general principle laid down in the first paragraph of Article 33. The Members of the United Nations are at complete liberty to solve their disputes as they deem fit so long as they do so in a way that does not endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

•         The right to self-defense is one of the most basic rights of any state. In recognition of this, Articles 2 and 51 of the U.N. Charter codify that right and affirm that every state is entitled to use self-defense to protect its territorial integrity and political independence.

•         When the Security Council acts on matters affecting peace and security, it must do so within the confines of both the U.N. Charter and the inherent rights of its member states. Thus Security Council resolutions may coexist with Eritrea's inherent right to self-defense, but they cannot abridge that right.

•         By imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea and thereby preventing it from defending its territory and population from Ethiopia’s aggression and occupation, the Security Council has clearly acted beyond its authority.

II.      Resolution 1907 Was Not An “African Initiative”

Within a few days since the adoption of the illegal, unfair and unjust sanctions resolution 1907 (2009), it had become abundantly clear that it was NOT an "African Initiative", that Africans had absolutely nothing to do with it. Libya, the chair of the African Union in 2009 opposed the sanctions at the UN Security Council. The 28-member Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) issued a press release condemning the sanctions resolution against Eritrea.

Susan E. Rice, the US Ambassador to the United Nations said that the sanctions were an “African Initiative”, but as the record will show, it was in fact a US-engineered sanction resolution. Ethiopia played a role in getting IGAD and the African Union to call for sanctions against Eritrea with the help of several US officials, including US Ambassadors in the Horn.

The IGAD and the Africa Peace and Security Resolutions were passed under the chairmanship of Ethiopia. Within days of Susan E. Rice´s visit to Ethiopia in May 2009 and her meeting with Ethiopian officials including Meles Zenawi on 19 May 2009, an emergency meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was convened and Ethiopia chaired the meeting. The 21 May 2009 Communiqué released after the meeting said:

"…The 33rd Extra-ordinary Meeting (Extra-ordinary No. 1) of the IGAD Council of Ministers was convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 20th May 2009 to discuss the developments in Somalia…The Council was chaired by H.E. Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the current Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers…"

According To The Communiqué: 
"…The meeting was attended by H.E. Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti; H.E. Moses Wetangula, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Sherif Hassan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia; H.E. Elsamani Elwasila, State Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Sudan, H.E. Sam Kutesa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda…"

In that meeting, Eritrea was falsely accused by Ethiopia of "calling for the overthrow of the TFG and attacks on AMISOM". It was also at that meeting that the call for the UN Security Council to "impose sanctions on the Government of Eritrea without any further delay" was made, with Ethiopia presenting the unsubstantiated allegations against Eritrea. Eritrea has never called for the overthrow of the TFG

Within days of Susan E. Rice´s departure from Ethiopia, on 22 May 2009, Meles Zenawi for this part, called a meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. According to the AU Communiqué :

"…The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 190th meeting held on 22 May 2009, considered the situation in Somalia in light of the outcome of the 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on the security and political situation in Somalia, held in Addis Ababa on 20 May 2009….

It Called On The United Nations Security Council To: 
"… impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, specially Eritrea, providing support to the armed groups engaged in destabilization activities in Somalia, attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM, as well as against all the Somali individuals and entities working towards undermining the peace and reconciliation efforts and regional stability…"

In Violation Of The African Union´s Own Rules Which Clearly State That:
"….Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings…"

Eritrea, the accused, was not present at that meeting and Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, (the accusers, judge and jury) who are parties to the conflict in Somalia participated in the meetings and pushed the resolutions against Eritrea, the one nation that has no bone in this ugly fight. These illegal meetings and decisions were orchestrated by Ethiopia, which served as the Chair of the Peace and Security Council at the time. The African Union never passed a resolution that included Djibouti. This was inserted in the sanctions regime by the US to ensure its adoption. (See v.6)

III.      Genesis Of The Sanctions Regime Against Eritrea

Somalia was just a pretext used to institute sanctions against Eritrea. The US Administration sought to punish Eritrea for not toeing Washington’s line on Somalia, but it also sought to punish Eritrea for forcing the United Nation’s Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) to leave Eritrea-it considered as an affront to the Security Council and threatened to take punitive actions against Eritrea. After first instigating the Djibouti-Eritrea conflict, US pursued its goals to get “stand alone” sanctions against Eritrea and Ethiopia served its tool in the Horn.

  

III.1. Presidential Statement S/PRST/2008/20 Of 12 June 2008-US Presidency At SC

This Statement unfairly condemned Eritrea and at the behest of Djibouti and the United States labeled Eritrea “the aggressor” (Similar statements were produced by the US State Department). Presidential Statements are not legally binding and reflected US position as it was holding the SC Presidency at that time.

There were no incursions by Eritrea on Djibouti territory and this was verified by the French. The Associated Press reported the following on 12 June 2008:

“…A military source said French forces based in Djibouti had carried out a reconnaissance on Thursday at the government’s request but had not been able to confirm an incursion…”

In addition, Inner City Press[vi] reported that Djibouti had distributed suspect information at the Security Council.

“… Inner City Press obtained a copy of the pamphlet, which strangely is dated February 2008, before the conflict at issue. The timeline inside, however, contains Djibouti's version of events, sometimes by the hour. On June 10 at 12:30, "the Eritrean troops opened fire to stop ("empecher") their soldiers from deserting," the Djiboutian presentation says. At 6:40 p.m., "the hour of prayer," the Eritreans again opened fire, the pamphlet continues…. “

III.2. Resolution 1862 (2009)

Once again, in violation of Eritrea’s rights enshrined in the UN Charter and Eritrea’s sovereign rights, the Security Council, at the behest of Washington, sought to impose its demands on Eritrea and set time frames. As a sovereign state with rights enshrined in the UN Charter, the Security Council clearly overstepped its powers to impose such restrictions on Eritrea. As shown below, this resolution began a series of actions taken by the US and Ethiopia to bring sanctions against Eritrea.

IV.      US-Ethiopia Collaboration:

 IV.1.   Jendayi Frazer Meets With Meles Zenawi At The United Nations-16 April 2007

Assistant Secretary Frazer met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on the margins of the April 16 Security Council's debate in New York on conflict mitigation in Africa. Zenawi and Frazer were discussing the United NationsMission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) and Zenawi was urging the UN to take actions against Eritrea. This cable shows once again that the 2% and remittances have nothing to do with Somalia and everything to do with appeasing the regime in Ethiopia:

“…He said the only effective way to approach Eritrea would be to go after the flow of remittance money, which he said would get a response from Asmara within two to three months if coupled with other UNSC sanctions…A/S Frazer replied that the prime minister should understand that most Security Council members were not considering sanctions against Eritrea but rather asking why the USG is not pushing Ethiopia to demarcate the E/E border as called for by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Meles replied that border demarcation is a non-issue -- "(Isaias) is not worried about pieces of land, and neither am I." The issue, he said, is war and peace, compounded by a history in which "idiots in our party had tried to humiliate Eritrea" in the past only to make "his idiots go lower than our idiots." PM Meles said that if Eritrea "would assure us there will be no war, we will take the risk (of demarcating the border). But we can't call on our people to fight again for the same bloody piece of land…"

IV.2.  James Swan US Ambassador To Djibouti told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the following on 23 July 2008

It should be recalled that Swan is one of several US officials that had a close relationship with Ethiopia’s lobbyists in Washington. On 4 August 2007, long before he was appointed to Djibouti, Swan made the following comments:

“…In view of Eritrea’s destabilizing role elsewhere in the region, this move against Djibouti can only be seen as yet another deliberate threat by this dangerous spoiler on the Horn. If confirmed, I will give my full support to international efforts to resolve this incipient conflict peacefully and restore the border to the status quo ante…”

  “… Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans' patriotism into hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea…”

Swan was instrumental in getting Djibouti to join Ethiopia in its anti-Eritrea campaign at the United Nations and was one of two US Bureau of African Affairs officials, James Knight being the second, to address the Security Council on Eritrea. His anti-Eritrea sentiments are a matter of public record.

IV.3.   May 2009-Susan Rice Meets With Meles Zenawi In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

 The UN Security Council members visited Ethiopia in May 2009. At that time, Susan E. Rice, the US Ambassador to the United Nations held a six hour meeting with Meles Zenawi. Here are excerpts from that conversation as recorded by the 21 May 2009 cable[vii] from the American Embassy in Ethiopia.

•   “…Prime Minister Meles underscored to USUN Ambassador Rice during a six-hour meeting that the most deadly phases of border conflict with Eritrea may have been avoided. The outbreak of hostilities in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia was never about the border dispute in Badme and Zelambessa It was about economic and political differences…”

•   “…Meles noted that after conflict broke out and the cessation of hostilities agreement was negotiated, a 26 mile buffer zone located in the Eritrean side was advocated by hard-liners on the Ethiopian side only as a means to humiliate Isaias…”

•   “…Meles suggested the Isaias' calculations would be shattered, if the U.S. and others imposed financial sanctions on him and particularly cut off Isaias' funding from Qatar and other countries and the important funding from the Diaspora in the U.S. Isaias still imposes a mandatory 2 percent of salary tax on all Eritreans living overseas. Non payment results in family members in Eritrea being denied food ration cards…”

IV.4.  13 August 2009-Susan E. Rice Meets With Fesseha Tessema, Ethiopia’s Charge D’Affaires

 Susan E. Rice played the leading role in getting sanctions against Eritrea and advised Ethiopian officials along the way. As the 17 August 2009 cable shows, during an August 13 meeting with US Ambassador Rice, Ethiopian Charge Tessema discussed plans to work with IGAD to agree on the components of a new draft resolution sanctioning Eritrea for its actions in Somalia and

Djibouti. According to the cable[viii], Rice and the Ethiopian officials discussed sanctions against Eritrea and how to get IGAD on board.

“…In an August 13 meeting with Ambassador Rice, Ethiopian Charge d'Affairs Ambassador Fesseha Tessema said he was encouraged by the African Union's recent call to sanction Eritrea for its support of armed opposition groups in Somalia and asked for U.S. "help and encouragement" in the creation of a new UNSC sanctions resolution…Ambassador Rice emphasized that any new sanctions resolution should be an Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative led by Uganda in the Security Council. She recalled IGAD's prior lack of consensus on a sanctions framework for Eritrea during its June visit to New York, and stated that any new resolution should reflect the common ground between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia…In response to Ambassador Rice's question about the position of China and Libya vis--vis sanctioning Eritrea, Tessema stated that China would not oppose the African Union's recommendation for new sanctions…On upcoming designations by the Somalia Sanctions Committee, Tessema stated that it is not the number of people, but rather the stature of the individual that is critical in making an impression with Eritrea. He assured Ambassador Rice that Libya would not oppose the listing of Eritrean Chief of Political Affairs Yemane Gebreab…”

IV.5.  19 September 2009-Susan Rice Meets With Meles Zenawi In New York

 According to the cable[ix] USUN Ambassador Susan Rice and African Affairs Assistant Secretary (A/S) Johnnie Carson met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on September 21 on the margins of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). According to the cable, “Meles said he doubted that Ethiopia’s border dispute with neighboring Eritrea would be resolved so long as Eritrean President Issais remains in power, and supported the idea of a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) sanctioning Eritrea for its illegal activities in Somalia and Djibouti”. More form that cable:

 “…Noting that there is a presumption, rightly or wrongly, that Ethiopia has not lived up to its international obligations in resolving its border dispute with Eritrea, Ambassador Rice encouraged Meles to take a fresh look at how to resolve the issue. Meles underscored his view that the border dispute is unlikely to be resolved as long as Eritrean President Issais is in power, as he &is opposed to any Ethiopian leadership on the issue8 and is not likely to take further initiative himself…”

“…Ambassador Rice asked Meles, views on a potential UNSC resolution creating a stand-alone Eritrea sanctions regime, separate from the existing Somalia sanctions regime (UNSCR 1844) under which Eritreans can be designated for threatening the peace and stability in Somalia, and violating Djibouti,s border, among other sanctionable actions. Meles strongly backs this approach…”

IV.6.  Susan E. Rice Meets With Yoweri Museveni In New York

During a 20 September 2009 bilateral meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, USUN Ambassador Rice told the Ugandan President that the U.S. supports a sanctions resolution on Eritrea that includes “a condemnation and action in response to Eritrea’s destabilizing activities in both Somalia and Djibouti”. According to the 29 September 2009 cable[x], Rice wanted the Djibouti issue included so that the sanctions would be adopted, but Uganda had reservations because the African Union had never passed a resolution that included Djibouti.

“…Rice emphasized that the U.S. strongly supports a resolution addresses the issue of Eritrea invading Djibouti. It is a matter of principle that the U.S. cannot ignore, which puts UNSC credibility at stake, and would make Eritrea feel it can continue to invade neighbors with impunity, she said…”

 “…Museveni expressed concern that references to both Somalia and Djibouti in the draft UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions resolution might jeopardize its adoption chances…”

  “…Rice said that she believes there is only one chance to secure a resolution, so Djibouti must be included, and noted that the international community has never effectively confronted Eritrea for invading neighboring countries on five occasions (Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia). She noted that in January, the UNSC gave Eritrea a deadline of six weeks to leave Djibouti or face sanctions…”

  “…Rice reminded Museveni that past experience suggested that the UNSC would not block a resolution led by African members and supported by the African Union. She shared the U.S. read that, if Burkina Faso and Uganda co-sponsor this resolution, the British will support, the French will "keep their heads down" and will not block…”

“…FM Kutesa noted that Uganda had no substantive concerns over including Djibouti in the resolution. His concern, he said, was that because the AU had never passed an actual resolution that included Djibouti, the Russian and Chinese delegations would have to consult with their capitals before agreeing to it…”

 Rice advised Kutesa not to be overly cautious, and reasserted that a resolution perceived to be African-led would not fail…”

IV.7.   Karl Wycoff Meets With Meles Zenawi In Ethiopia-19 November 2009

Karl Wycoff met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for 90 minutes on

19 November 2009. According to the 30 November 2009 cable[xi], the two discussed Eritrea. According to the cable:

“…Prime Minister Meles raised Eritrean misbehavior several times.  He said Ethiopia is convinced that Eritrea realizes it cannot destabilize Ethiopia before the latter's

May 2010 elections and so has decided to target its destabilization efforts for the period just after the elections…He said Ethiopia's response to Asmara's efforts to destabilize Ethiopia, Somalia and, more recently, Djibouti and Yemen has been almost exclusively passive but added that he wanted to give us a "heads up that we are looking at options." He said, "We would be happy to stand down if developments outside the area obviate the need to become more pro-active…”

  “…Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told visiting AF/DAS Wycoff and CDA on November 19 that he wanted to give the USG a "heads up" that Ethiopia was considering actively supporting armed Eritrean opposition groups if the international community fails to take action to isolate Asmara…”

  “…Making clear what international community actions would persuade Ethiopia to stand down, Meles expressed particular disappointment that the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) has not taken action to impose a sanctions regime on Eritrea.  He urged the U.S. to redouble sanctions efforts and especially to reconsider targeting remittances as what he called a "key instrument" for pressuring Asmara…He said "If the U.S. were to insist that paying taxes to Asmara is a felony, it would be easier for them to resist the tax.

The Diaspora could say, 'We can't pay you.'…"

“…Wycoff agreed that Eritrea has shown no signs of changing its behavior but suggested that the broadening discussion of sanctions, including Ambassador Rice's personal involvement at USUN, has caught the attention of Eritrean President Isaias. Wycoff added that the USG has worked to undercut support for Eritrea, including his own visits to Gulf countries to enlist their support in such activities… ”

IV.8.  Karl Wycoff In Djibouti-13 December 2009

 According to the 13 December 2009 cable, during a December 9 courtesy call, Karl Wycoff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Ambassador James Swan discussed U.S.-Djibouti relationship, “Eritrea's regional spoiler role with Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita.  Wycoff expressed strong USG support for a tough U.N. sanctions resolution on Eritrea. According to the cable[xii]:

 “…DAS Wycoff said that the U.S. remained very concerned over Eritrea's "unhelpful" regional role, including its support for al-Shabaab in Somalia and its incursion across the border with Djibouti…”

  “…DAS Wycoff assured Dileita that senior U.S. officials-including Ambassador Rice and A/S Carson-were closely following and supporting the draft UNSC resolution on sanctions against Eritrea. The U.S. firmly agreed with Djibouti's position that the resolution needed to address both Eritrea's interference in Somalia, and Eritrean behavior vis-a-vis the border dispute with Djibouti…”

 “…The stalemated Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute remains a central GODJ priority, and as Djiboutian leadership becomes increasingly frustrated with continued Eritrean intransigence, U.S. efforts to support Djibouti in the UNSC are recognized and appreciated…”

Wycoff and other US officials, including US Ambassadors in the region worked to bring sanctions against Eritrea and used regional leaders and organizations to effectuate their agendas.

IV.9.   23 December 2009-Susan Rice Meets With French officials To Push For Eritrean Sanctions

US Ambassador Susan E. Rice met with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner on 7 December 2009 and asked France to support efforts to sanction Eritrea. According to the 23 December 2009 cable

“…Ambassador Rice urged Kouchner to support U.S. efforts to impose Security Council sanctions on Eritrean officials who are undermining the Djibouti agreement and giving active support to the al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia…”

 “…Rice pointed out that it had been a year since the Security Council had threatened sanctions against Eritrean officials if they did not comply with their international obligations, and it was time for the Council to make good on its promise…”

“…Kouchner stated that Eritrea served as the only conduit to Somali extremists regarding the final humanitarian worker held hostage. Rice said she understood that France did not want to drive the sanctions process…that Russia and China were hiding behind French reluctance to move ahead with sanctions. African members of the Security Council wanted to get the sanctions in place during December, and had toned down the draft resolution considerably in order to attract wider support…”

V.      Conclusion

 If there was evidence to support the allegations against Eritrea, there would have been no need for the extensive campaign by Ethiopia and the US. Neither Ethiopia, nor the United States have ever presented verifiable evidence to show any wrong doing by Eritrea. The sanctions were illegal, unfair and unjust and were engineered by the US to effectuate US policy for Eritrea.