Wednesday, 27 November 2013

Article: How US Administration Undermined Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Process

By Sophia Tesfamariam

The Eritrean Quislings League (EQL), a disparate group of self-proclaimed “Intellectuals and Professionals”, national service evaders, defectors, pedophiles, religious extremists who support groups like the Boko Haram in Nigeria and fringe Christian groups in the Bible belt, human traffickers and smugglers responsible for the tragic death of Eritreans in the Sinai, the Sahara desert, the Red Sea and Mediterranean and bankrupt mercenaries in their employ scream foul and jump in defense of the west, especially the United States, all the while undermining Eritrea, its people and government. Everyone that knows a thing or two about Eritrea and its magnanimous people knows that:
· Eritrea does not fabricate, lie, pretend etc. to advance its political interests at home or abroad.
· Eritrea does not harbor any ill will against the United States or the American people and only seeks justice and respect for the rights of her people.
·  Eritrea does not make accusations it cannot back up with facts and evidence-and seeks the same when being accused.

So when Eritrea puts the responsibility for the “stalemate” in the Eritrea Ethiopia border issue squarely at Washington’s feet-it is not because it imagined it to be, but because the facts actually do show that it is the US (with its allies in tow) that has single handedly undermined the Algiers Agreements it witnessed and guaranteed, attempted to amend, revise, re-visit the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commissions’ (EEBC) final and binding delimitation and demarcation decisions of 13 April 2002 and November 2007 respectively, and provided the minority regime in Ethiopia the diplomatic, economic, political, and military shield and support as it continues to occupy sovereign Eritrean territories, including Badme, the casus belli of the Eritrea Ethiopia border conflict of 1998-2000.

The orchestrated vilification and defamation campaigns by the EQL and their handlers intensified when the EEBC, which had the sole mandate to delimit and demarcate the Eritrea Ethiopia border refused to allow the various gimmicks and ploys presented by Ethiopia and its handlers in order to amend, revise, re-visit and annul the EEBC’s final and binding decisions.

After publicly claiming to have "won" in court and accepting the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission's decision as final and binding and urging the international community to pressure Eritrea for the speedy demarcation of the border, Ethiopia defiantly held the demarcation activities hostage by demanding changes, amendments, and revisions, with acquiescence and tacit approval of the United States and its allies.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (“the Commission”) following its meeting in private session in The Hague on 20 November 2006 to consider procedures to be followed in connection with the demarcation of the boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia issued a Statement in which it painstakingly documented Ethiopia’s obstructions to its mandate and work. The EEBC said “the obstacles from the Ethiopian side took various forms”:

· prohibiting field-work within the territory under its control, thus impeding the survey of ground control points for the aerial photography and the secondary datum survey (April to July 2002);
· filing extensive comments on the Delimitation Decision, amounting to an attempt to reopen elements of the substance of that Decision, instead of limiting itself to the requested comments on the draft 1:25,000 maps (January 2003);
· alleging that the Field Liaison Officers appointed by Eritrea were intelligence officers and refusing to allow field work to continue in Ethiopian territory, then failing to appoint ad hoc Field Liaison Officers within the prescribed time limit following the Commission’s Order of 9 February 2003 so as to allow field work to resume without further delay (January to February 2003);
· failing to appoint new Field Liaison Officers for the remaining demarcation activities following the Commission’s Decision pursuant to Article 15B of the Demarcation Directions (July 2003 to March 2006);
· failing to provide assurances for the security of all demarcation personnel (August 2003 to the present); failing to comment on maps which indicated the pillar locations in the Eastern Sector (September 2003);
· repeatedly refusing to authorize necessary flight requests lodged by the Chief Surveyor; eventually limiting the Commission’s field work to the Eastern Sector by statements that the ad hoc Field Liaison Officers would only be permitted to operate in the Eastern Sector; complaining to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of what Ethiopia termed “illegal, unjust and irresponsible decisions” of the Commission in respect of Badme and parts of the Central Sector, and proposing that the Security Council set up an alternative mechanism to demarcate the parts of the boundary it contested (September 2003);
· denouncing in that same letter the Commission’s Delimitation Decision by stating that it would only recognise the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone (“TSZ”) as the international boundary;
·  failing to provide assurances for the security of the contractors selected for the emplacement and as-built survey of the boundary pillars (September to October 2003);
· rejecting the Commission’s invitation to attend a meeting on 5 November 2003, claiming that the notice was too short and that there was no likelihood of anything being achieved (October 2003);
· refusing to permit any work to be carried out by the Commission’s field staff in the Western and Central Sectors until the boundary in the Eastern Sector had been demarcated and subject to Ethiopia’s approval of the Commission’s method of demarcation (November 2003);
· failing to make prompt payment of its share of the Commission’s expenses (February 2004 to February 2005);
· rejecting the Commission’s invitation to a meeting to be held on 22 February 2005 on the ground that the meeting was premature, would be unproductive and could have an adverse impact on the demarcation process, as a result of which the Commission was obliged to cancel the meeting (February 2005);
· failing again to meet its financial obligations (May 2006 to the present); introducing qualifications to its previously unqualified acceptance of the final and binding quality of the Delimitation Decision (17 May 2006);
· failing to respond to the Commission’s request for assurances of freedom of movement and security for its staff travelling to the region to reopen the Commission’s Field Offices (July to August 2006);
· and failing to respond to the Commission’s invitation to a rescheduled meeting on 24 August 2006…”

Ethiopia which depends on the US and its allies to feed tis people, manage its economic, social and military sectors and subsidize 60% of its budget has been emboldened by the shield and support it receives.

Suffice it to highlight the following US Embassy cables that clearly show the extent of US interference and influence in appeasing the minority regime in Ethiopia as it violated international law, the EEBC’s final and binding decisions and the over two dozen UN Security Council resolutions that called on it to abide by its moral and legal treaty obligations.


“…Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told visiting DAS Don Yamamoto and Charge Huddleston November 29, that the time is not yet ripe to move forward on the boundary dispute with Eritrea . The Prime Minister said he would not send a team to attend a meeting called by the EEBC, but was not opposed to a future meeting. Meles maintained that resolution of the border issue was dependent on Eritrean President Isaias accepting a dialogue on normalizing relations...”

Vicki Huddleston wrote:

“…Meles' stated position remains unchanged. Progress on the border can proceed only if Meles is assured of a dialogue with Eritrea on normalizing relations and Isaias receives equal assurance of demarcation of the border. Potential elements for moving both parties proposed by the EEBC discussed are "open borders", allowing free movement of people without restrictions after demarcation; and giving full authority to the EEBC to demarcate the border, including areas where there are "anomalies and impracticalities." Ultimately, when both sides view the necessity for peaceful bilateral discussions, resolution of the border will become a greater priority…”


·  “…Legwaila stated that following Ethiopia's demobilization of 150,000 troops before 2003, PM Meles had told him that Ethiopia's strategy was to isolate Eritrea and wait for it to implode economically. According to Legwaila, Meles's five-point peace proposal of November 2004 therefore represented a shift in policy, and reflected an attempt to engage Eritrea constructively in talks. Legwaila explained that Article 416 of the cease-fire agreement called for the UN to deal with the consequences of demarcation (e.g., in providing funds to resettle those in border areas that would be transferred among parties). Whereas the UN was originally envisioned as providing humanitarian or technical assistance, Ethiopia now sought to invoke the article to have the UN play a larger political role, Legwaila said. Eritrea, however, has explicitly rejected contacts with both the SRSG and with UN Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea Lloyd Axworthy…”

· “…Upon the announcement of the EEBC's decision in April 2002, Ethiopia's foreign minister hosted a celebration and issued a statement hailing the decision as a victory for both parties; however, Ethiopia had not realized that Badame had been awarded to Eritrea. The reason for this is the the EEBC did not identify Badame so it took sometime for the experts to determine to whom Badame had been given. Legwaila observed that delimitation of the border (i.e., determining where it lies) was complete, whereas demarcation (i.e., placing physical markers) was stalemated. Delimitation of the border had been conducted professionally and impartially, Legwaila said, through an Asmara-based chief surveyor armed with GPS equipment and assistance from New Zealand experts, and with aerial mapping conducted by a Swedish company. Demarcation would reflect the boundaries determined by delimiation -- there would be very little change, e.g. Badame would remain in Eritrea…”

· “…Ethiopia's general objection to demarcation lies partially in the August 2003 demarcation directives, Legwaila explained, which instruct surveyors to confirm the EEBC's delimitation of the border. Specifically, an instruction for surveyors to confirm a line between "point 9 and point 6" would serve to have them reaffirm the EEBC's decision that places Badme on the Eritrean side. Ethiopia cannot accept Badme as Eritrean territory, Legwaila explained, as doing so would compel Ethiopia to recognize that it was the aggressor when entering Badme during 1998 hostilities…”


· “…On January 19-20, AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer, AF Special Assistant Kendra Gaither, and AF Military Advisor COL Kevin Kenny, accompanied by Charge, DATT, and deputy pol/econ counselor, visited the following sites on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border: -- Adigrat, Sector Center headquarters for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), manned by UNMEE's Indian battalion (INDBATT); -- Zelambessa, in UNMEE's Sector Center; and -- the disputed town of Badme, currently under Ethiopian control but awarded to Eritrea in the April 2002 decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC). The USG delegation met only with UNMEE officials at Adigrat and Zelambessa. On January 20, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) airlifted the delegation to Badme. A young NCO assisted with Amharic interpretation as the group moved throughout Badme, speaking at random with male and female residents of Badme, ranging from young schoolchildren to the elderly, in what was clearly an unexpected visit. The local administrator of Badme said that Badme had 5,000 residents. The delegation also met with UNMEE military observers (MILOBs) at UNMEE's Badme team site….”

· “…She said she had a better understanding of the challenges Meles faced in implementing the EEBC decision, citing the "strong impression of Ethiopian identity in Badme." She said that residents of Badme were well-informed and opinionated, spoke with "the passion of a people invaded," and had criticized the EEBC decision as unjust, unfair, and unbalanced. Badme villagers, including a one-legged man who said he was prepared to sacrifice his remaining leg, claimed that they would rather go to war than live under Eritrean administration. Elders, who spoke Amharic rather than Tigrinya, asserted that Eritrean President Isaias had banned a traditional song whose lyrics identified a nearby river as the boundary…”

·  “…Meles had told A/S Frazer that he accepted the EEBC decision, and that the GOE's caveat that it accepted the decision (only) "in principle" came as a suggestion offered by the UK. For Meles, the problem was the implementation of the EEBC's decision, for which he seeks dialogue with Eritrea, she added. SRSG Legwaila said that Meles dropping the caveat would be a positive development, which would then allow the international community to push Eritrea. Legwaila noted that "in principle" did not appear in the GOE's January 16 memorandum on the border situation submitted to the UN Security Council. Legwaila agreed not to publicize Meles' flexibility on "in principle," however…”

Jendayi E. Frazer’s comments are very telling of her ill intentions and desire to appease Meles Zenawi. This is what the cable says:

· “…Meles had told A/S Frazer that he accepted the EEBC decision, and that the GOE's caveat that it accepted the decision (only) "in principle" came as a suggestion offered by the UK. For Meles, the problem was the implementation of the EEBC's decision, for which he seeks dialogue with Eritrea, she added. SRSG Legwaila said that Meles dropping the caveat would be a positive development, which would then allow the international community to push Eritrea. Legwaila noted that "in principle" did not appear in the GOE's January 16 memorandum on the border situation submitted to the UN Security Council. Legwaila agreed not to publicize Meles' flexibility on "in principle," however. Amb. Frazer said that even if Meles were to drop the caveat, the GSE may not necessarily welcome it. She explained that she had informed EPFDJ head of political affairs Yemane Ghebreab, who was visiting Washington and then Paris, of her trip to the border, and had told him that the next steps needed were: a meeting of the Witnesses (including the U.S., AU, and EU) to the Algiers Accord, a meeting of the EEBC, and then the beginning of demarcation. Yemane responded that only the EEBC, not the Witnesses, had the mandate and legal authority to demarcate the border; that Ethiopia must accept the decision "as is"; and that the USG delegation had visited "occupied territory." Amb. Frazer said she had reminded Yemane that Badme was sovereign Ethiopian territory until demarcation…”

Vicki Huddleston, US Charge D’Affaires considers Ethiopia ’s occupation as an “advantage” for Ethiopia . In her comments she writes:

“…Progress on demarcation, however, is another matter. It is clear from our visit to Badme that local Ethiopian authorities are making no preparations to transfer Badme to Eritrea , and that local sentiment strongly opposes the EEBC decision. While it is important for the United States to build on the momentum generated by A/S Frazer's visit, the parties may have their own strategic interests for maintaining the status quo. As SRSG Legwaila observed in a January 19 briefing to the USG delegation (septel), prior to its visit to the border, if the border is not demarcated, then "advantage Ethiopia ," as Ethiopia currently occupies all the contested areas…”


Meles Zenawi told Vicki Huddleston, US Charge D’Affairs and CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral Rick Hunt on 13 June 2006 that Ethiopia would attend the June 15 EEBC meeting in the Hague, but believed the “process was a dead end” and would soon break down because Eritrean Isaias had not yet committed to peace.

“…Meles said that Ethiopia 's bottom line was that there had to be discussions on problem areas of the border. The EEBC, he claimed, was eating away at that bottom line a little bit at a time. The PM recalled that the EEBC had said that the boundary had already been demarcated -- a position Ethiopia could not accept. "If we go ahead with demarcation without any commitment to dialogue, we will have given away everything that we have been working for over the last several years." He added that Ethiopia could not sign on to some consultant's view of anomalies in the EEBC line…”


·  “…Meles faces tough opposition with the powerful Central Committee, particularly with the hard-core Tigray leaders who wield authority within the committee. Meles has always indicated in very private meetings that he is willing to compromise on Badme if it would bring sustainable peace, but it would cost him his prime ministership. Until there are signs of compromise from Eritrea towards an Ethiopian solution (normalization of relations in conjunction with demarcation), Meles is stuck in the current impasse…”

·  “…Despite the fact that neither side appears ready to resolve their problems, Post believes as a result of the continued seriousness of the border impasse, actions must be taken to avoid war. Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are deeply interwoven, adversely affecting the demarcation process. Resolution of the bilateral problems must be addressed as part of the resolution of the demarcation impasse. Demarcation of the border will not sustain peace and will exacerbate divisions unless a comprehensive package dealing with the fundamental differences of the two countries are also addressed. Ethiopia,s position of bilateral (normalization talks) discussions and Eritrea,s expansion of the battlefield to include arms sales in Somalia to undermine Ethiopian security have made the demarcation process complex. Post views the current situation as serious and recommends following actions be taken to avoid conflict and re-engage parties…”

· “…Both Witnesses and UNSC declare firm commitment to a demarcation process and recognizes the EEBC process and its decision to demarcate by map coordinates. However, the Witnesses and UNSC must not/not take any action to enforce such a decision and must clearly and unequivocally declare that both parties ultimately must resolve their differences directly and demarcate the border…”

6. MELES ON ERITREA, THE ONLF, AND THE OGADEN -30 August 2007 (Yamamoto)

· “…In an August 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Meles said that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) has no legal basis to demarcate the Ethio-Eritrean border by geographic coordinates. He argued that while Eritrean President Isaias may remove the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from Eritrea, Meles does not expect either war or an improvement in the situation…”

· “…In light of his long personal relationship with Isaias, seeking Meles' insights on tactics to use in pressuring Isaias and the GSE could be fruitful…”


“…Prime Minister Meles called in the local Ambassadors from UN Security Council member states on January 21 to urge them to advise their respective representatives in New York to remain neutral during discussions by the UNSC on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and extension of the mandate for the UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). Meles emphasized that Ethiopia opposed any UN endorsement of the decision by the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) of November 2006, finalizing the border through map coordinates or "virtual demarcation…”


OBJECTIVES: USUN should seek to: (1) extend UNMEE's mandate for six months; (2) continue the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ); (3) avoid discussion of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission's demarcation decision by map coordinates and any pressure for the parties to implement it; (4) support the SYG's efforts to engage the parties; and (5) support efforts to lift restrictions on UNMEE, especially the current fuel crisis.


“…Seyoum stated that his letter argues against "virtual demarcation." Further, the letter argued that the EEBC cannot demarcate the border by coordinates without the agreement of the parties. The Foreign Minister added that the EEBC is not a legal body; it is a creation of the parties to help with the delimitation and demarcation process of the border…”


“…Meles added that the EEBC's "virtual demarcation" decision of November 2006 was not in accordance with the Algiers process and should not be supported or affirmed by the U.N. Meles has told the international community in the past that the border is symptomatic of deeper bilateral problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea and that the way forward is through direct dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia on the fundamental differences that divide the countries and which gave rise to the border conflict before demarcation can be peacefully implemented. Without this step, there can be no lasting peace between the two countries…”


· “…Department [US State Department]requests action addressees in Security Council capitals to approach host governments, in cooperation with other Security Council members as useful, to discuss the future of UNMEE and how the Security Council should address the challenge posed to its authority by Eritrea. Department requests USUN to do the same with appropriate UN Missions in New York….”

· “…Potential options include: -Imposing a travel ban on key Eritrean government officials. -Placing an assets freeze on these same officials and/or other Eritrean assets/resources. -Imposing trade, investment, or other restrictions related to Eritrean resources, including mining. -Imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea…”


Judging from the cable written after Meles Zenawi’s meeting with Ambassadors, Donald Yamamoto knew exactly what the regime in Ethiopia meant by “dialogue” and said so in his cable. Yamamoto wrote:

“…Both Meles and Isaias agreed to abide by whatever decision the EEBC made. While we cautioned both parties to consider an appeals process into the agreements, both refused. Meles has been pushing dialogue as a means to change the EEBC's final demarcation decision. We and the Witnesses fully support dialogue, but only in the context of normalizing relations and discussing the consequences of demarcation, not adjustment of the EEBC's decision. Ultimately, any adjustment of the decision must be made by the parties themselves as it will be up to the parties to implement the decision…”

As for the new proposal that Meles Zenawi was offering, this is what Yamamoto had to say:

“…It would be useful if the UNSC reiterates its support for the Algiers Accord and Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and emphasizes the parties' responsibilities and commitments therein. We strongly recommend that Ethiopia not propose a new "regime" or set of agreements to be negotiated to determine how to settle the border and the problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea . This would prove messy, would raise questions on how we proceed with resolution of the border, and would mean the end of the Algiers process…”


“…Meles appears content to allow the status quo with Eritrea continue with no resolution of the border impasse, and he would not welcome any new attempt by the UNSC to engage on this issue. For Meles, the Algiers Agreements and the EEBC decision are "dead," having expired when President Isaias ejected UNMEE from Eritrea in 2008. He is disappointed that the UNSC did not take action against Asmara over its unprecedented expulsion of the UN peacekeeping force. Meles has repeatedly told U.S. officials that the issue can be revisited when there is a new government in Asmara, possibly under a new mechanism to demarcate the border. He believes that he "can wait Isaias out," and that sooner or later, the Eritrean people will rise up and depose Isaias…Meles believes that the UNSC has not adequately punished Isaias over his actions regarding the Eritrea-Djibouti border issue. Both Meles and the AU are supportive of UNSCR 1862, but both are opposed to any attempt by the UNSC to link resolution of the ER-DJ border issue to the ET-ER border impasse…”


In a 13 August 2009 meeting with Tessema, the Ethiopian Charge, Susan E. Rice suggested that Ethiopia come up with another demarcation plan and she also “proposed that a third party could offer some legitimacy to the demarcation project”. According to the 17 August 2009 cable, Susan E. Rice met with the Ethiopians to work on the sanctions resolution against Eritrea . In addition to her discussions about the stand alone sanctions against Eritrea :

“…Ambassador Rice lamented the lack of progress over the last nine years on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute while pressing Ethiopia to regain the "moral high ground" by presenting a new demarcation plan, stating that some Security Council members may wish to reference the dispute in a new sanctions resolution. Ambassador Rice said that by making progress on the border issue, Ethiopia would underscore its commitment to peaceful neighborly relations, placing the onus on Eritrea to take the next step. Tessema urged Ambassador Rice to avoid drawing a parallel between sanctioning Eritrea and resolving the border dispute, stating that Ethiopia has always been ready to engage, but Eritrea has refused dialogue. Tessema explained that without participation from Eritrea, complete border demarcation is impossible due to ambiguities created by the Border Commission's 2000 decision that must be jointly addressed. Ambassador Rice explained that Ethiopia 's strategy of engaging Eritrea in dialogue is now dated due to its entrenched isolationist position. She emphasized that Ethiopia should instead create a new demarcation plan to address the border anomalies that does not require engagement with Eritrea…”


“…A/S Frazer expressed appreciation for Lord Triesman's earlier offer of whatever support the UK might be able to provide to facilitate resolution of the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute, including use of the prestigious Lancaster House where historic agreements have been concluded in the past. She said the USG has tried to revive the Boundary Commission process, but Isaias would not engage. Triesman admitted he was not sure who could get Isaias to respond LONDON 00008106 003 OF 003 positively, and Lloyd added "it's not clear we're the right people," because Eritrea sees the UK as biased in favor of Ethiopia . Triesman was open to Dr. Frazer's suggestion of a possible co-chair arrangement involving the UK and Norway . Both sides agreed that the Boundary Commission's intent to proceed with "virtual demarcation" would do more harm than good. The British indicated they were working indirectly to nudge the Commissioners away from that course of action…


“…In Eritrea's view, demarcation was no longer an issue because the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) demarcation decision by geographic coordinates had settled the boundary issue once and for all. (C) Stephanides [Joseph Stephanides is UNMEE Addis Ababa Head of Office] opined that Eritrean President Isaias had determined to remain firm on his hard-line stance to wait until the next administration in Washington to "deal with the Democrats." He said Isaias would remain inflexible and may even backtrack, but that Isaias would have to show his cards in July when the UN would have to decide on UNMEE's future. (Note: Stephanides, in a separate meeting with PolOff on April 8, criticized the SYG's report noting that paragraph 49 undermined the possibility of establishing a mission on the Ethiopian side of the border because it states that, "...such a mission could be perceived by one party as freezing the status quo and serving the interests of the other..." He also noted that paragraph 51 would anger the Ethiopians because it called into question Ethiopia 's commitment to the EEBC decision and that the report came dangerously close to an endorsement by the SYG of the EEBC's demarcation by geographic coordinates. Paragraph 51 notes that, " Ethiopia 's position that the demarcation coordinates determined by the (EEBC) are invalid...raises questions about its commitment to accept the final and binding status..." He emphasized that any endorsement of the "virtual demarcation" by the UN would drive the Ethiopians to leave the Algiers Agreement.)…”

The regime in Ethiopia and its sponsors continue to peddle Ethiopia’s precondition, “dialogue”, to prolong the “no war, no peace” situation as Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrea continues. But the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission eloquently stated in its 16 Report to the UN Security Council

“…Ethiopia is not prepared to allow demarcation to continue in the manner laid down in the Demarcation Directions and in accordance with the timeline set by the Commission. It now insists on prior “dialogue” but has rejected the opportunity for such “dialogue” within the framework of the demarcation process provided by the Commission’s proposal to meet with the Parties on 22 February. This is the latest in a series of obstructive actions taken since the summer of 2002 and belies the frequently professed acceptance by Ethiopia of the Delimitation Decision…”

12 December 2013 will mark the 13th Anniversary since the siging of the Algiers Agreements between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The UN Security Council ought to shoulder its moral and legal obligations and call on the regime in Ethiopia to vacate from sovereign Eritrean territories and restore Eritrea’s sovereignty.

The rule of law must prevail over the law of the jungle

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